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This paper examines equity and efficiency properties of voluntary international 
environmental agreements. A classical welfare economics framework is used while 
focusing on one particular instrument, i.e. emissions trading. It is demonstrated that 
if emission permit allocations face no constraints, that is if the allocation of ‘hot air’ 
and negative permit endowments are allowed, the classical efficiency rule is 
preserved and we obtain a ‘first best’ solution. This result however breaks down 
when permit allocation constraints are imposed. If one of these constraints is 
binding, the global abatement target and the permit distribution are determined 
simultaneously. An empirical application confirms this result and reveals that binding 
allocation constraints shift the abatement target away from the first best solution. 
When more stringent stability concepts are imposed, the constraints on 
endowments become less binding. The welfare loss due to these constraints 
however gets larger as we become more inequality averse. 
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Global warming is a typical common’s problem: many regions contribute to pollution by 
emitting greenhouse gases and the greenhouse effect resulting from this pollution, will 
cause damage to all individuals from the current and future generations in all regions of the 
world. Effective control of such a problem requires an international agreement that should 
be characterised by three desirable properties: efficiency, equity and voluntary 
participation.  
Efficiency refers on the one hand to an efficient allocation and on the other hand to cost 
efficiency. The efficient allocation rule determines how far we should go in reducing 
emissions, i.e. it determines our environmental target. If this environmental target is 
achieved at the lowest possible welfare cost, cost efficiency prevails. This is the case if 
marginal abatement costs across all participating regions are equalised. As developing 
regions face in general lower marginal abatement costs, it is desirable from an efficiency 
point of view to get them involved in the international environmental agreement (IEA). 
However, since lower marginal abatement costs require more abatement efforts from 
these nations, efficiency and equity principles come into conflict unless there are 
international transfers to compensate poorer nations.  
Voluntary participation is necessary since no supranational authority exists to impose the 
international agreement. In this respect, some authors have investigated the concept of 
individual rationality. It states that countries will only be wiling to sign the IEA if they are 
not worse off under the agreement compared to the non-cooperative Nash outcome. The 
importance of these participation constraints for IEAs has already been emphasised by 
Barrett (1992). Eyckmans et al. (1994) used this stability concept when studying the 
equity and efficiency implications of three different international carbon agreements. 
Another stream of literature analyses the stability of IEAs and focuses on the concept of 
internal and external stability, introduced by d’Aspremont (1983) who used it to study 
cartel formation in an oligopoly (see for instance Barrett, 1994 and Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1993). It states that, once the agreement is accomplished, no region should have an 
incentive to withdraw from the agreement in order to free ride on the efforts undertaken 
by the remaining signatories. Similarly, no signatory acting alone should want to accede to 
the IEA. A typical result emerging from this literature is that when the difference in net 
benefits between the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcome is large, i.e. when an 
IEA is needed most, the self-enforcing IEA can only sustain a small number of signatories 
and hence can only marginally improve upon the non-cooperative outcome (Barrett, 1994).  
This paper focuses on one particular instrument to reduce greenhouse gases through an 
IEA: the imposition of tradable emission quotas. The advantage of such a system is that it WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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provides a framework in which efficiency, stability and equity principles can be dealt with 
in the following sense. First, assuming a perfectly competitive permit market, regions will 
continue trading until their marginal cost of abatement equals the permit price. Hence 
marginal abatement costs are equalised and cost efficiency prevails. Secondly, the 
assignment of emission quotas can be used as a means to compensate potential losers 
from the IEA. Therefore participation constraints in this context of tradable emission 
quotas can be translated into an allocation of permits such that cooperation is rational. 
When specifying these participation constraints, we will consider both the individual 
rationality requirement as the internal stability concept. Thirdly, if the two previous 
conditions are satisfied, one can look whether there is some room left for equity issues. If 
this is the case, the initial allocation of tradable permits can be manipulated further in 
order to redistribute the benefits the different regions will get from trading. 
In brief, the idea is to define a solution concept that trades off efficiency and equity such 
that the agreement is still self-enforcing. Dutta and Ray (1989) already combined stability 
and egalitarianism in transferable utility games. In a more recent paper, Germain and van 
Steenberghe (2001) explore the link between equity and the requirement of coalitional 
rationality while considering several allocation rules. As is common in the climate change 
literature dealing with equity, these allocation rules are derived from different equity 
principles such as the egalitarian principle, ability to pay, sovereignty, etc. (Rose et al., 
1998). A drawback of this approach however, is that there exists no consensus on what 
constitutes an equitable agreement. Since one cannot choose for a particular equity 
criterion without relying on a value judgement, there exists little hope that, as long as the 
equity debate is carried on these criteria, an international consensus will be reached.  
In this paper a classical welfare economics framework will be used in which equity 
considerations can be parameterized. Hence, the discussion on some “ad hoc” equity 
principles can be avoided. In particular, we look for a self-enforcing international tradable 
permit agreement that maximizes social welfare. Eyckmans et al. (1993) already used a 
social welfare maximizing framework to illustrate that in a world without side payments 
(i.e. in a second-best world) the traditional cost-efficient abatement prescription need not 
be optimal: instead of marginal costs to be equalised across regions, weighted marginal 
costs should be equalised across regions. The weights are necessary to satisfy either the 
participation constraints or to include equity concerns in the absence of international 
transfers.  
Our welfare maximization problem however might result in an outcome in which some 
nations are allocated a negative emission endowment, implying that these nations have to 
pay for every ton of carbon they emit and in addition they face an additional fee on top of 
that. Another possibility is that certain regions receive an emission permit allocation that WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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exceeds their business as usual emissions as is the case with Russia in the Kyoto protocol. 
The situation where assigned amounts of emissions are higher than the expected business 
as usual emissions in the commitment period is referred to with the term ‘hot air’ 
(UNFCCC, 1998). The former possibility is not likely to be considered as an acceptable 
option in an IEA and will therefore be ruled out. The debate on the desirability of allocating 
hot air however is still going on. In this paper we explore the impact of outlawing negative 
endowments and hot air on the permit price, on the global abatement target and on 
welfare. 
Before continuing we should note that two important simplifying assumptions are made. 
First, in order to focus on the equity/efficiency trade off within a permit trading scheme in 
its pure form, we neglect spillovers to other markets. Hence the model considered is a 
partial equilibrium model. Secondly, the model in its current form is static and covers only 
one time period. To make it more interesting and realistic, it should be made dynamic so 
that banking of permits is possible. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical setup of the 
model. Section 3 deals with international carbon agreements in general. First, the 
optimization problem of a coalition of countries will be elaborated. Secondly, the concept 
of a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) w.r.t. a coalition is defined. Subsequently, 
two extreme scenarios as to cooperation are considered as a benchmark, i.e. the Pareto 
efficient and the non-cooperative scenario. Finally we discuss two different stability 
concepts that can be used to specify the participation constraints in the optimization 
problem. In section 4 we focus on one particular instrument, i.e. an international tradable 
permit agreement. After characterizing the permit market equilibrium, we look for a 
welfare maximizing permit allocation. A distinction will be made between unconstrained 
permit endowments and permit endowments being constrained to be positive and/or by 
business as usual emissions. Because it is difficult to derive analytically in which direction 
the global abatement target will change due to binding allocation constraints, the empirical 
application in section 5 provides us with more insight in the different effects at play.  
2. THEORETICAL  MODEL 
Consider a world economy with a set of regions  { } 1,..., Nn = . The preferences of each 
region are represented with a simple utility function that is increasing in the region’s own 
income  i X  and in the global abatement effort  N a  undertaken: 
() () ,, ii i iN UXa Ta   (1) WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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The utility functions are twice continuously differentiable and bounded over 
2
+ R . The 
second argument of the utility function, the total level of abatement, is equal to the sum 








The first argument of the utility function, region i’s income  i X , depends on the individual 
abatement level  i a  and is defined as: 
() () , ii i i ii i X aT Y C a T ≡− +  
where  i Y  denotes the baseline income level,  () ii Ca is region i’s cost of abatement and  i T  
denotes a transfer to region i. This transfer can be positive or negative. We assume that 
the baseline income level results from straight income maximization without environmental 
concern and that the abatement cost functions are increasing and convex in  i a . This 
abatement level  i a  of region i is equal to the difference between its fixed business as 
usual emission level  i E  and its actual emission level  i E  where the business as usual level 
is the one that would occur in absence of any environmental concern: 
i i i E E a − = . 
Following Welsch (1993), we define the lower bound on abatement as  ii i aEz ≡−  where 
i z  denotes the maximal economically sustainable emission level for country i. This allows 
for negative abatement efforts if a country decides to increase its emissions relative to the 
reference period. Assuming in addition that a country will not abate more than its business 
as usual emissions, the individual abatement  i a  is defined over the interval  , ii i aE  ⊂  R .  
This form (1) of the utility function captures the fact that each region bears the cost of its 
own abatement efforts but benefits from the abatement efforts undertaken by other 
nations. 
3.  INTERNATIONAL CARBON AGREEMENTS  
3.1.  Group welfare optimization 
In negotiations on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) we often observe that 
cooperation is only partial. In the case of global warming, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on 
greenhouse gases emission reduction may be seen as an example of such partial cooperation. WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Assuming that the objective of a coalition is to maximize its welfare as a group, it has to 
decide on two matters:  
(i)  The environmental target or the amount of emission reduction to be undertaken. 
This is the issue of an efficient allocation.  
(ii)  The distribution of efforts over the different coalition members such that the 
environmental target can be achieved at the lowest possible cost. This is the problem 
of cost efficiency.  
When determining the environmental target, a coalition needs to take into account how 
outsiders to the coalition determine their abatement strategies. In this respect, we will use 
the notion of a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) introduced by Chander and 
Tulkens (1995 and 1997). It can be described as a Nash equilibrium where the players are 
coalitions instead of individual countries and will be elaborated further in section 3.2. This 
equilibrium concept should be clearly distinguished from a Stackelberg equilibrium in which 
a dominant group of countries chooses its abatement strategy first and the other regions 
are followers.  
The distributional aspects of an international carbon agreement can be dealt with in 
different ways. Previous work in the climate change literature dealing with equity in the 
international burden sharing, mostly focuses on some ad hoc equity concepts (for an 
overview see especially Rose et al., 1998). In the context of tradable permits, a 
grandfathering rule for instance implies that permits are allocated in proportion to the 
regions’ historical emissions. The egalitarian rule allocates to each nation an equal amount 
of quotas per capita. Since no consensus exists on what constitutes an equitable permit 
allocation, we opt for an approach in which inequality considerations are parameterized in 
a generalized group welfare function.  
3.2.  Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium w.r.t. a coalition 
Suppose that a coalition  { } 1,..., Ss N =⊆  forms. The PANE w.r.t. coalition S  can be 
interpreted as a special type of Nash equilibrium in which a coalition S  coordinates its 
policies, taking as given the emission strategies of the outsiders who, in turn, are playing a 
non-cooperative Nash strategy against S . Formally, a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium 
w.r.t. coalition S  is defined as a combination of strategies that solves simultaneously the 
following maximization problems: WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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(1)  for all insiders  : iS ∈  
() ()
() ()
11 ,..., , ,..., max , ,
.. , , 0
0
ss
ii i i i S S aa TT
iS
TP
ii i iS S i
i
iS
UX a Ta a




















≡∑  and  SS N aa a − +=  
(2)  for all outsiders  \: j NS ∈  
() () max ,0 ,
j
jj j j j a UXa a a − +  (3) 




≡∑  and  jj N aa a − +=  
The insiders to a coalition S  choose an abatement strategy  { } 1,..., Ss aaa =  in order to 
maximize a group welfare function, taking the strategies of the outsiders  S a−  as given. In 




= ∑ . These weights can 
be interpreted as ethical weights in a group welfare maximization framework or as 
bargaining weights in a bargaining context (Eyckmans et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, since there is no supranational authority to impose the IEA, it is important 
that the agreement is self-enforcing. For this reason, participation constraints are imposed 
on the welfare maximization problem. We will label the utility a region can get by deviating 
with 
TP
i U  where TP refers to threat point. At this stage no attention is devoted yet to the 
choice of a particular stability concept. This will be dealt with in section 3.3. In order to 
compensate potential losers from the IEA, we assume that lump sum side payments 
denoted by  i T  between coalition members are possible. These transfers must be budget 
balanced or sum up to zero. 
The outsiders  \ j NS ∈  act as singletons when maximizing their welfare. They determine 
their abatement strategy  j a  so as to maximize their own welfare, taking the strategies 
j a−  of the other outsiders and of the coalition as given. Since these countries do not 
receive a transfer their income is equal to  () () ,0 ii i ii X aY C a =− .  
3.2.2. Insider  behaviour 
The Lagrangian of the coalition’s maximization problem can be defined as follows: WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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() ( ) ( ) () 11 1 ,..., , ,... , ,..., , , ,
TP
s ss i i i i i i N i i j
iS iS jS
aa T T U X a T a U T ππ ψ λ π π ψ
∈∈ ∈

=+ − − 
 ∑ ∑∑ L  
The first order conditions with respect to  i a  are given by 
() ( ) () ,, 0
CS CS CS CS
ii i jj j j j N
jS
Ca BX a T a i S λλ
∈
′′ −= ∀ ∈ ∑   (4) 



















jjN N CS CS CS








 is the marginal benefit of abatement to 
region j expressed in terms of income, both evaluated in the PANE w.r.t. coalition S  
which we denote by the superscript CS.  i λ
~
 stands for the marginal social value to region i 



















 is a function of three parameters: the weight  i λ  of region i in the group welfare 
function, the shadow price  i π  of region i’s participation constraint and the marginal utility 
of income to region i. From condition (4) it can be seen that the higher  i λ
~
, the lower is the 
abatement requirement imposed on the region.  
The shadow prices  i π  of the participation constraints are determined by the following 
Kuhn Tucker conditions:  
() () () () , , 0; 0; , , 0
CS CS TP FB CS CS CS TP
ii ii N i i i ii ii N i UXa T a U UXa T a U iS ππ  −≥ ≥ − = ∀ ∈ 
Thus, if the participation constraint for region i is binding, i.e. if  () () ,
CS CS TP
ii ii i UXa T U = , 
the shadow price 
CS
i π  is strictly positive and enhances the social welfare weight  i λ . 
The first order conditions with respect to the transfers  i T  are given by 
i iS λψ =∀ ∈    (6) 
Hence, if lump transfers are possible, maximizing group welfare requires that the marginal 
social valuation of income  i λ
~
 is equalised across all coalition members. As long as this is 
not the case, group welfare can be increased by redistributing income from nations with a WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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lower  i λ
~
 to nations with a higher  i λ
~
. A higher marginal social valuation of income can be 
due to (i) a higher power or ethical weight of the region in the group welfare function, (ii) a 
higher marginal utility of income (which is the case for poorer regions since we assume 
that utility functions are concave), (iii) a positive shadow value of the region’s participation 
constraint or a combination of these three factors.  
Substituting condition (6) for  i λ
~
 into (4), leads to the following expression, also known as 
the Samuelson rule for the optimal emission reductions by coalition S .  
() ( ) ,
CS CS CS
ii j j N
jS
Ca BX a i S
∈
′′ =∀ ∈ ∑  (7) 
This condition pins down the coalition’s abatement target at its optimal level since the 
marginal cost of each region equals the sum of all marginal benefits. Indeed it illustrates 
that an optimal abatement policy by coalition SN ⊂  internalizes all damages from all of 
its members but disregards damages to outsiders of the coalition. Furthermore, this 
expression implies that in order to achieve the coalition’s abatement target at the lowest 
possible cost, marginal costs should be equalized across all coalition members.  
3.2.3. Outsider  behaviour 
The outsiders only take into account their own damages when determining their optimal 
environmental policy. This is reflected by the first order conditions of the outsiders’ 
maximization problem (3) with respect to  j a : 
() () () () () ,,
\
CS CS CS CS
jj j N jj j N CS
jj
jN









() () () ,\
CS CS CS
jj j jj N Ca BXa a jNS ′′ =∀ ∈    (8) 
where  () () ,
CS CS
jj j N B Xa a ′  again stands for the marginal benefit of emission abatement to 
region j expressed in terms of income, evaluated in the PANE w.r.t. coalition S . According 
to condition (8), outsiders from a coalition abate emissions up to the point where their 
marginal cost equals their marginal utility of abatement in terms of marginal appreciation 
of an extra unit of income and they disregard the marginal abatement benefits of the other 
regions.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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3.2.4.  Two extreme PANE scenarios 
In this section we explore two extreme cooperation scenarios that are encompassed by 
the definition of a PANE, i.e. the Pareto efficient scenario (SN = ) and the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium ( { } Si =  for any iN ∈ ).  
a) Pareto  efficiency 
It is useful to consider the full cooperative Pareto efficient scenario as a benchmark. In this 
scenario, also referred to as the first best problem, all n regions are assumed to participate 
in the IEA. In this sense the Pareto efficient scenario can be considered as a special case 
of a PANE in which all regions belong to the coalition.  
In order to characterize the optimum, we assume that there exists a global planner that 
disposes of the vector of individual abatement levels () 1,..., n aa  and of lump sum side 
payments () 1,..., n TT  as instruments to maximize social welfare. Formally, the problem is 
very similar to the one of the insiders in a PANE (see (2)). The only difference is that now 
all regions are insiders hence  SN aa =  or there are no reaction functions of outsiders to be 
taken into account.  
Hence, the Pareto efficient solution can be found by maximizing the following social 
welfare function  
() ()
() ()
11 ,..., , ,..., max , ,  with  1
.. , , 0
0
nn
ii i i i N i aa TT
iN iN
TP















The Lagrangian function associated to this maximization problem is given by: 
() ( ) ( ) () 11 1 ,..., , ,... , ,..., , , ,
TP
nn n i i i i i i N i i j
iN iN jN
aa T T U X a T a U T ππ ψ λ π π ψ
∈∈ ∈

=+ − − 
 ∑ ∑∑ L  
Deriving the first order conditions w.r.t.  i a  and  i T  analogously to section 3.2.2, we 
obtain: 
i iN λψ =∀ ∈    (9) 
() ( ) ,
FB FB FB
ii j j N
jN
Ca B X a i N
∈
′′ =∀ ∈ ∑  (10) 
where FB refers to First Best.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Hence, according to condition (9) the optimal transfers in a first best world should be such 
that the marginal social valuation of income  i λ   is equalized across all nations. Condition 
(10) is also known as the Samuelson rule for Pareto efficient provision of emission 
reduction. It pins down the global abatement target at its optimal level and states that in 
order to achieve the global abatement target at the lowest possible cost, marginal costs 
should be equalized across all nations.  
b) The  Nash  equilibrium 
If regions do not sign an international IEA, such a situation can be characterized by means 
of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the Nash equilibrium, each player chooses its strategy 
in order to maximize its own welfare, taking the strategies of the other players as given. A 
Nash equilibrium is often called strategically stable or self-enforcing since no single player 
wants to deviate from his or her strategy. 
Assuming that all n regions behave non-cooperatively, they choose their abatement level 
i a  in order to maximize their utility, taking the abatement efforts of the other regions as 
given. Hence the problem we have to solve is exactly the same as the one of the outsiders 
of a coalition given by (3):  
() () max ,
i
ii ii i a UXaa a iN − +∀ ∈   (11) 
The first order conditions of this maximization problem w.r.t.  i a  are 
() () () ,
NC NC NC
ii i ii N Ca BXa a i N ′′ =∀ ∈    (12) 
where  ()
NC
ii Ca ′  and  () () ,
NC NC
ii i N BXa a ′  denote respectively the marginal abatement costs 
and the marginal abatement benefit of region i, both evaluated in the non-cooperative (NC) 
outcome. Condition (12) shows that in the non-cooperative equilibrium regions indeed only 
take into account their own benefits from emission reduction when determining an 
emission reduction strategy.  
The Nash equilibrium is found by solving simultaneously the system of n first order 
conditions in (12). Under the assumptions of (i) compact and convex strategy spaces 
, ii i aE i N  =∈ ∀ ∈  R S , (ii) utility functions  () () , ii iN UXaa  twice continuously 
differentiable and bounded over 
2 iN + ∀∈ R  and (iii) concave utility functions 
() () , ii iN UXaa  in  i ai N ∀∈ , there exists at least one Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 
(see Friedman, 1986). For further reference we call the Nash utility level of region i 
NC
i U . WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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The difference with the PANE outcome for the outsiders as described in section 3.2.3 is 
that in the Nash equilibrium the utility level of region i will be lower than the utility level of 
region i if it were an outsider in a PANE. The reason is that in the Nash equilibrium, 
countries do not benefit from the higher emission reduction efforts undertaken by the 
coalition in a PANE. 
3.3. Stability  concepts   
Thus far we defined the participation constraint of region i by means of a not specified 
threat point 
TP
i U . In order to make this more concrete, we have to stipulate what 
constitutes a self-enforcing IEA. There exists however no consensus among economists on 
this matter. Therefore we will explore in this section two stability concepts which are 
commonly used in the literature on IEAs, i.e. individual rationality (see for instance 
Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997)
1) and internal & external stability (see for instance 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991, 1993, Barrett, 1994).  
3.3.1. Individual  rationality 
If under a certain agreement a region is worse off compared to the non-cooperative 
outcome, it will not accept this agreement. In this case we will say that the proposed 
agreement does not satisfy individual rationality. Formally, the individual rationality 
requirement implies that the agreement should satisfy the participation constraint of each 
region i, given by: 
() () ,, 0
NC
ii i iN i UXa Ta U iN −≥ ∀ ∈  (13) 
where 
NC
i U  denotes the earlier specified utility of region i in the Nash equilibrium. 
The underlying assumption of this stability concept is that if a country i deviates from the 
coalition  S , this will lead to a complete disintegration of the remaining coalition  { } \ Si . 
This constitutes a strong threat to possible deviators since the other players will react on a 
deviation by choosing their Nash strategy, resulting in small emission reductions. This 
assumption can be justified by arguing that players are pessimistic or cautious when they 
consider deviating (Eyckmans, 2001).  
                                             
1 They consider also the concept of coalitional rationality, a concept that we did not study here for practical 
reasons: it would imply that 2
16 coalitions have to be checked in our empirical application since the model 
contains 16 regions.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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3.3.2. Internal  and external stability 
Another stream of literature in environmental economics uses the stability concept 
developed by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) in the context of cartel formation. An agreement 
is said to be stable if (i) no signatory wants to withdraw unilaterally from the agreement 
and if (ii) no nonsignatory wants to join the agreement. 
Formally, coalition SN ⊆  is said to be stable if it is 
(i)  I
nternally stable: 
{ } \ for all   and
Si S
ii UU i S ≥∈  (14) 
(ii)  E
xternally stable: 
{ } for all j \ .
Sj S
jj UU N S
∪ ≥∈  (15) 
The internal stability concept is built on the assumption that deviators compare their 
payoff being a member of a coalition to their free riding payoff. They assume that if they 
have left the coalition, the remaining coalition  { } \ Si  remains together so that they can 
still enjoy the benefits of the coalition’s environmental policy without contributing any 
effort their selves. This assumption can be justified by arguing that players are optimistic 
when they consider deviating (Eyckmans, 2001).  
4.  AN INTERNATIONAL TRADABLE PERMIT AGREEMENT 
In the previous section we discussed the PANE w.r.t a coalition, assuming that lump sum 
transfers are possible to stabilize the IEA and to compensate poorer regions to the extent 
that there is still some scope left. In this section we make the more realistic assumption 
that there is no unlimited effective international side payment scheme available but that 
transfers between regions occur in the form of emissions trading. More specifically 
emissions trading implies transfers of the following form: 
() ii i Tp E ω =−  
where  p  denotes the permit price,  i ω  is the permit endowment to region i and  i E  
denotes the actual emissions of region i. Depending on whether region i is a net importer 
() ii E ω <  or net exporter () ii E ω > , the transfer will be negative or positive.  
In this setup the only policy variable is the initial allocation of emission rights  i ω  over the 
participating regions. In section 4.1 we will study the permit market equilibrium and derive 
individual abatement supply functions. In section 4.2 we will consider whether the 
previously derived Samuelson conditions still hold, even if we put restrictions on the 
allocation of permits.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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4.1.  Permit market equilibrium 
In order to characterize the permit market equilibrium, we make the following 
assumptions. Permit trading takes place between firms and there is only one 
representative firm per region. Furthermore, we assume that there are enough permit 
sellers and buyers so that the firms are price takers. Firms choose their optimal abatement 
level  i a  in order to maximize profits. We make the simplifying assumption that the level of 
abatement chosen has no influence on the firm’s production output. Hence, when 
determining their optimal abatement level, firms only consider the revenue they get from 
permit trading. Formally, firms choose their abatement level in order to maximize the 
following profit function:  
() () max
i
iii i a p aE C a i S ω +− − ∀ ∈
 
(16)
The first term denotes the revenues the firm gets from selling permits. Since the 
abatement level is equal to the difference between business as usual emissions  i E  and the 
actual emissions  i E , this can also be rewritten as  () ii p E ω − . The second term is the 
cost of abatement. The first order conditions of this problem are given by:  
() ii p Ca i S ′ =∀ ∈  (17) 
I.e. firms are willing to abate emissions up to the point where their marginal cost of 
abatement equals the permit price which they take as given. This is an attractive feature 
of permit trading as a policy instrument since it ensures cost efficiency. 
From condition (17) we can derive firm i’s supply function of emission abatement in 
function of the permit price:  
() ()
1
ii i Cp a p i S α
− ′ =≡ ∀ ∈  (18) 










α′ == >∀ ∈
′′
 (19) 
I.e. from the convexity of the abatement cost functions, we obtain that the individual 
abatement supply is increasing in the permit price. The aggregate abatement supply  S a  by 





aa pC p α
−
∈∈ ∈
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′′ ∑∑    (21) 
This derivative describes the effect of a change in the permit price on the overall emission 
abatement effort: the higher the permit price, the more abatement will be undertaken. It 



















   (22) 
The intuition behind this result is that the larger the global abatement level is, the more 
costly it gets to reduce emissions further due to convexity of the abatement cost 
functions, what implies a higher permit price. 
The permit market equilibrium for the set of regions { } 1,...,sS =  is given by the price  p  
with  0 p ≥ , for which the total abatement level  S a  equals total business as usual 
emissions minus the aggregate permit level  S ω , or:  









=∑ . Thus, by fixing the aggregate permit level  S ω , the 
total level of abatement  S a  is also implicitly determined. Combining condition (23) and 





−= ∑  (24) 
Hence through pinning down the total amount of permits to be distributed in coalition S , 
the total amount of emission reduction that will be undertaken within coalition S  and thus 
also the level of the permit price is implicitly determined. Therefore, the permit price can 
be written as a function of total permit endowment  S ω : 
() S p ρ ω =  
















− ′ === < ∀ ∈
′ ∑
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where we have used condition (22) and (23) for the last step. Hence, an increase in total 
endowments causes a reduction in the permit price what strokes with our intuition since 
emission permits become less scarce. 
4.2.  Welfare maximizing permit allocation 
4.2.1. Unconstrained  emission permit allocation 
First we solve the PANE w.r.t. coalition S  with the allocation of permits not being 
constrained. That is, we allow for an endowment that exceeds a country’s business as 
usual emissions (so called ‘hot air’) and for the allocation of a negative amount of permits.  
As stated earlier (see paragraph 3.2), in the PANE w.r.t. S , a coalition S  coordinates its 
policies, taking as given the emission strategies of the outsiders who, in turn, are playing a 
non-cooperative Nash strategy against S . Hence the outsiders  \ iN S ∈  choose an 
emission abatement strategy as to maximize their own welfare, taking the abatement 
strategies of all other countries as given. Their maximization problem is exactly the one 
specified by condition (3). The first order conditions derived from this also carry through: 
() ( ) ,\
CS CS CS
ii i i N Ca BX a i NS ′′ =∀ ∈  
where the superscript CS denoted that we are in the PANE w.r.t. coalition S . 























where the income of region j is redefined as follows: 
() () () () () () jj jS jj S S j S j XY C E ωα ρ ω ρ ωα ρ ωω    ≡− − − −     (27) 
j Y  is the baseline income level,  j E  denotes the business as usual emissions of region j, 
j ω  stands for the emission endowment allocated to region j,  () S ρ ω  denotes the permit 
price in function of the total emission permit endowment  S ω ,  () () jS αρ ω  is the supply 
of abatement of region j in function of  S ω  and  () () jj S C αρ ω      is region j’s abatement 
cost function.  
Expression (27) states that the income of region j now includes, besides the baseline 
income level minus the cost of abatement, the cost or revenue from emissions trading. If 
the region is a net permit buyer, the last term between square brackets in (27) (business WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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as usual emissions minus sum of abatement effort and permit endowment) is positive and 
the region faces an extra cost. If the region is a net permit seller, this term will be negative 
and the region will see its income increase.  
The corresponding Lagrangian function for the coalition welfare maximization problem is 
defined as: 
()
() () () () () () () () ()
11 ,..., , ,...,
,
ss





SS j S S UY C E
U
ωω ππ




=+ − − − −
−




In Appendix A : it is shown that the first order conditions w.r.t.  i ω  of this maximization 
problem can be reduced to:  
() ()
()














  (29) 
where  () () jj j S j NIM E α ρ ωω =− − denotes net permit imports of region j. This 
condition reveals that the right hand side is equal for all regions that belong to the coalition 
or: 
UC
i iS λλ =∀ ∈   (30) 
where UC refers to the emission endowments being unconstrained. Condition (30) states 
that in a world with unconstrained allocations, optimization requires that emission rights 
are distributed in such a way that the marginal social value of income is equalized across 
all regions. Using (30) and replacing  () S ρ ω  by  ()
'
ii Ca(see condition (17)), we can 
rewrite (29) as follows: 
() ( ) () , ii S j j jN
jS jS
Ca N I M BXa i S ρω
∈∈
′′ ′ =+ ∀ ∈ ∑∑  (31) 
Since the unweighted sum of net imports over all regions equals zero, and using condition 
(17), expression (31) can be reduced to the well known Samuelson rule for the optimal 
emission reductions by coalition S : 
() ( ) ,
CS CS CS
ii j j N
jS
Ca BX a i S
∈
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Hence we have obtained the same equilibrium conditions as we obtained for the PANE 
scenario with lump sum transfers (see condition (8) and (7) from paragraph 3.2). 
4.2.2. Constrained  emission permit allocation 
a)  Case 1: Positivity restriction on  i ω  
Imposing positivity restrictions on the allocation of permits does not alter the equilibrium 
conditions for the outsiders to the coalition. Therefore we focus on the maximization 
problem of coalition S . The problem of coalition S  is identical to problem (26), except for 
one additional constraint, i.e. the permit allocations are not allowed to be negative, or: 
0 i iS ω ≥∀ ∈    (33) 
In this case, the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be derived: 





≥≤ = ∀ ∈  ∂∂ 
LL
 (34) 







. In Appendix A : we derived from this that among unconstrained regions, 
the marginal social values of an extra unit of income are equalized: 
()
()













where the plus-sign refers to the fact that we are dealing with a positivity restriction and 
the superscript UC here denotes that the positivity constraint is not binding.  








() () 0 iS S jj j j
jS jS
NIM B λρω ρ ω λ λ
∈∈
′′ −− < ∑∑    or: 
()
()













This implies that 
UC
i + < λ λ
~ ~
. This condition reveals that in contrast with the unconstrained 
emission abatement problem, the marginal social value to region i of an additional unit of 
income is region specific and thus is not equalized across all counties in the optimum. This WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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result can be interpreted in the following way: since group welfare maximization requires 
the marginal social values of income  i λ   to be equalized across countries, the marginal 
social value of income for region i is ‘too low’. Bearing in mind the definition of  i λ   (see (5)







 of country i 
(if we leave the weight  i λ  of each region in the group welfare function unchanged). Hence 
region i’s income  i X  should go down. In other words, reducing the income of region i by 
giving it a negative emission permit endowment would increase overall welfare but this is 
not possible because of the constraint imposed on  i ω .
2 
b)  Case 2: ‘No hot air’ restriction on  i ω  
Problem (26) is now extended with the following constraint: 
i i Ei S ω ≤∀ ∈  (35) 
This expression states that the emission permits a region receives are not allowed to 
exceed the region’s business as usual emissions or, in other words it denotes that 
allocating hot air is not allowed. The Lagrangian can then be formulated as follows:  
()




,..., , ,..., , ,...,
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From the first order conditions with respect to  i ω  we can now derive that the marginal 
social value of income of region i must be equal to: 
()
()













  (36) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the additional constraint are the following: 
() 0; 0; 0 ii i ii i EE i S ωφ ω φ −≥ ≥ − = ∀ ∈  
We know that if the allocation constraint is not binding for region i, i.e. if  ii E ω ≤ , the 
Lagrange multiplier of the no hot air constraint  i φ  equals zero and we can again write that 
                                             




BAU i λ λ
~ ~
=  where BAU  refers to the emission endowments being constrained by their 
business as usual emissions and the superscript UC again denotes that the constraint on 
emission endowments is not binding. 
If however the allocation constraint is binding for region i, the Lagrange multiplier  i φ  is 
strictly positive which implies that 
()
UC UC i





=+ >  . This means that the 
marginal social values of an additional unit of income are not equalized in the optimum for 
regions facing a binding ‘no hot air’ restriction on their emission endowment. The 
interpretation of this is that overall welfare would increase if region i was allocated a larger 
amount of permits but this is impossible because of the upper constraint (35) imposed on 
the permit endowments
3.  
c)  Case 3: Positivity and ‘no hot air’ constraint on  i ω  
We now add constraint (33) and (35) simultaneously to problem (26). Formally this implies 
that 0 i i E ω ≤≤. We can distinguish three different possibilities: 




+ = λ λ . The plus-sign and BAU refer to the fact that we impose both the 
positivity constraint as well as the ‘no hot air’ restriction on the maximization 
problem. 




+ < λ λ . 




+ > λ λ . 
d) Assessment 
From the previous sections we can conclude that when constraints are imposed upon the 
allocation of permits which is the only redistribution instrument in our model, the 
Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of emission abatement by coalition S  breaks 
down. Hence, equity and efficiency considerations cannot be separated any more but have 
to be considered simultaneously. It is however difficult to derive definite analytical results 
on the consequence of positivity and no hot air constraints on the global abatement target 
and the permit price. Therefore we provide a description of the different effects at play.  
Let us first focus on condition (29) which can be rewritten as follows: 
                                             




















We know that the optimality condition requires that  ,
UC
i BAU λλ + =  . Using this, condition (37) 
reduces to: 




′ =∑  
This states that the permit price should equal the sum of marginal benefits of the coalition 
members.  
In the case where marginal social values of income are not equalized across regions, 
condition (37) can be interpreted in the following way. If we use λ   to refer to the vector 
of marginal social values of income of regions { } 1,...,s  and we denote the vector of net 
imports by NIM , the covariance between these two vectors can be written as follows 












Hence by plugging this in to condition (37), we obtain 
()
















This states that if the covariance between λ   and NIM  is positive, i.e. if the marginal 
social value of income and the net imports of countries are positively correlated, the 
permit price  () S ρ ω  will be lower (remember that  () 0 S ρω ′ < ). If on the other hand this 
covariance is negative, i.e. if countries with a low marginal social value of income are net 
permit importers, the permit price will be higher.  
In the context of climate change we can expect that poor countries with a high marginal 
utility and hence a high  i λ   will typically be allocated more permits. In addition, poor 
countries face in general lower marginal abatement cost functions and therefore they 
abate more. As a result, poor countries are expected to be rather permit exporters. Based 
on analogous reasoning, rich countries on the other hand are expected to be permit 
importers. Hence, the covariance is likely to be negative, resulting in an upward pressure 
on the permit price. This reasoning however neglects the presence of participation WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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constraints. Due to these constraints, it might be the case that richer countries are 
allocated more permits so that they import less or even might become a permit exporter. 
This would exert an upward pressure on the covariance or might it even turn it into a 
positive figure which would result in a lower permit price. Furthermore the second term 
between square brackets in (38) also plays a role. This weighted sum of marginal benefits 
will tend to be smaller (larger) than the unweighted sum if high marginal benefit regions 
face a lower (higher)  i λ   and low marginal benefit regions have a higher (lower)  i λ  . All 
these different interfering factors prevent us from drawing definite conclusions with 
respect to the change in the permit price due to constrained allocations. 
Another way to assess the results of the previous sections is to consider how the different 
components of the countries’ pay off are affected if the permit price changes. We 
distinguish between three different effects due to an increase (decrease) in the permit 
price: (i) all regions face a higher (lower) cost of abatement since a higher (lower) permit 
price implies that regions will abate more (less) (see condition (19)), (ii) permit selling 
countries receive more (less) revenues and permit buying countries face a higher (lower) 
cost of purchasing permits, (iii) all regions face less (more) environmental damage or more 
(less) benefits from emission reduction bearing in mind that a higher price implies more 
abatement (see condition (21)). 
Let us focus on the case of a permit price increase with respect to the first best solution. 
The first and the third effect work in opposite directions (respectively welfare deteriorating 
and welfare improving) but do not depend on whether a region is a net permit buyer or a 
net permit seller. The second effect on the contrary, influences the welfare of net permit 
buyers negatively whereas it increases the welfare of net permit sellers. This result is 
summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Effect of a permit price increase on regions’ welfare 
  Net permit buyer  Net permit seller 
  Effect on region’s welfare  Effect on region’s welfare 
Abatement cost  −  − 
Net permit trading 
revenue  −  + 
Environmental 
benefit  + + 
In the case of binding positivity constraints we found that we wanted to reduce the 
welfare of the constrained region(s). Being constrained, such regions receive an emission 
permit endowment of zero and hence are (net) permit buyers. From Table 1, we see that a WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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reduction in welfare for the constrained regions can be realized by an increase in the 
permit price, i.e. by distributing fewer permits in total, if the extra costs due to this 
measure are not outweighed by the resulting environmental benefit. If the environmental 
benefit due to a price increase would be larger than the incurred costs, a price decrease 
would be more appropriate.  
For regions with binding ‘no hot air’ constraints on the contrary, we wanted to increase 
welfare. These regions will be net permit sellers since they receive an endowment exactly 
equal to their business as usual emissions. From Table 1 it can be seen that this can be 
achieved by increasing the permit price if the resulting increased abatement cost does not 
outweigh the increased environmental benefit and permit trading revenues for the 
constrained regions. This will always be the case because regions will not sell emission 
permits if the cost to reduce these emissions exceeds the revenues they can get from it.  
An empirical application should provide us with more insight in the effect on the global 
abatement target and the permit price of imposing both restrictions simultaneously. 
Intuitively, one would predict an increase in the permit price through a reduction in the 
number of permits distributed. Indeed, if the marginal benefit of emission reduction is not 
too high for the countries with binding positivity constraints, both constraints call for an 
increase in the permit prise (if they are binding). In addition, the positivity constraints are 
expected to be less restrictive than the no hot air constraints since the presence of 
participation constraints will probably withhold us from allocating negative endowments to 
most regions.  
5.  SOME EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS  
5.1. Model  description 
As mentioned before, an empirical simulation is indispensable to gain more insight in how 
the imposition of positivity and ‘no hot air’ constraints influences the global abatement 
target and the permit price. We tried to use as well as possible the information available in 
the literature.  
We divided the world into 16 homogeneous blocks of countries. Table 2 summarizes some 
relevant information on those regions
4 for the reference year 2010. Data are based on IEA
5 
statistics (2001) for 1995 on which we applied growth rates calculated from one of the 
IPCC
6 emission scenario’s
7 (2000). Percentage shares in world GDP, in world carbon 
                                             
4 For more details on geographical coverage, see Appendix E :. 
5 International Energy Agency 
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
7 We used the A1B-AIM scenario belonging to the A1 scenario family which describes a future world of very 
rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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emissions and in world population are reported in the first three columns of Table 2. Also 
GDP per capita, per capita carbon emissions and the ratio of emissions over GDP are 
shown.  
Table 2:Regional characteristics (2010) 
 GDP   emissions  population  GDP/cap  emis./cap  emis./GDP 
  (%)  (%)  (%)  (US$/cap)  (ton C/cap)  (kg C/US$)
CAN    1.61  1.41 0.46 24322.32 4.38  0.18
USA    20.36  15.96 4.08 34378.86 5.53  0.16
JPN    14.25  3.54 1.95 50421.58 2.57  0.05
EU15   23.88  9.62 5.80 28400.88 2.35  0.08
OEU    1.28  0.22 0.18 48668.94 1.73  0.04
CEA    1.57  2.03 1.41 7685.69 2.04  0.27
FSU    2.46  6.65 4.22 4025.46 2.23  0.55
AUZ    1.21  0.95 0.34 24765.78 3.99  0.16
MED    1.98  3.44 3.99 3420.92 1.22  0.36
MEA    2.71  7.17 3.14 5935.86 3.23  0.54
AFR    1.77  4.00 12.22 997.11 0.46  0.46
CHN    5.24  20.16 20.86 1730.46 1.37  0.79
IND    2.20  5.41 16.01 948.83 0.48  0.50
RAS    9.37  7.86 13.19 4897.45 0.84  0.17
SAM    9.61  9.44 10.08 6573.73 1.33  0.20
ROW    0.50  2.15 2.07 1676.50 1.47  0.88
world 100.00  100.00 100.00 6895.20 1.41  0.21
(source: IEA (2001) and IPCC (2000))
CAN = Canada   MED = Mediterranean 
USA = United States of America  MEA = Middle East 
JPN = Japan   AFR = Africa 
EU15 = European Union   CHN = China 
OEU = Other Europe   IND = India 
CEA = Central   RAS = Rest of Asia 
FSU = Eastern Europe   SAM = South America 
AUZ = Australia and New Zealand   ROW = Rest of the world 
GDP per capita is highest in Japan and in the other European countries whereas in India 
and Africa GDP per capita is lowest. Also from this table we can read that the USA and 
China emit most in absolute values. In terms of emissions per capita however, Canada and 
the USA emit most while the largest emitters in terms of emissions per GDP are China and 
the ‘rest of the world’, indicating that they are inefficient carbon users.  
Preferences of different regions are represented by the following constant elasticity of 
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introduction of new and more efficient technologies. In particular, A1B describes a balanced technological 
change across all sources where balanced is defined as not relying too heavily on one particular energy source 
(IPCC, 2001). The model used to develop the scenario is the Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the 
Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan (Morita et al., 1994) 
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where  i pop  denotes the exogenous population and the parameter ε  determines the 
concavity of the utility function and can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion 
in a welfare maximization framework. The larger ε , the more weight we will attach to 
poorer countries when maximizing the group welfare function. Indeed from specification 
(39) it can be seen that in the utility function each region’s GDP per capita is weighted by 
its own GDP per capita to the power () ε − . Hence we can state each region’s weight in 










   (40) 
where  i Y  is the baseline GDP per capita for region i and the subscript p refers to the 
poorest region. The division by the poorest nation’s GDP per capita is done in order to 
normalize the weights so that the poorest region always gets a weight equal to one for all 
values of ε . We derived specification (40) from our constant elasticity of marginal utility 
specification but a combination of linear utility functions and a concave parameterisation 
of social welfare W as a function of GDP per capita would result in the same weighting 
scheme. In Table 3 the pattern of weights for different values of ε  is shown. For our 
purposes we put  0.5 ε =  throughout the paper but in section 5.5 this figure will be 
submitted to a sensitivity analysis. 
For the marginal cost functions we use the following specification from Nordhaus (1991) 
calibrated to the simulation results obtained with the OECD-GREEN model Burniaux et al. 
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Since our model contains a larger number of regions than the one of Eyckmans et al. 
(1993), we replicated for the new regions the parameter  i β  from the geographically 
matching region.  
                                             
8 This is an approximation, based on the assumption that the abatement cost and the revenue or cost of permit 
trading together are not large enough to change a country’s position in the GDP per capita ranking. WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Table 3: Distributional weights 
  ε  
  0.01 0.10 0.30 0.40 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50
CAN    0.97  0.72  0.38 0.27 0.20 0.04 0.01  0.00 0.00
USA    0.96  0.70  0.34 0.24 0.17 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.00
JPN    0.96  0.67  0.30 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00
EU15    0.97 0.71 0.36 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
OEU    0.96  0.67  0.31 0.21 0.14 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00
CEA    0.98  0.81  0.53 0.43 0.35 0.12 0.04  0.02 0.01
FSU    0.99  0.87  0.65 0.56 0.49 0.24 0.11  0.06 0.03
AUZ    0.97  0.72  0.38 0.27 0.20 0.04 0.01  0.00 0.00
MED    0.99  0.88  0.68 0.60 0.53 0.28 0.15  0.08 0.04
MEA    0.98  0.83  0.58 0.48 0.40 0.16 0.06  0.03 0.01
AFR    1.00  1.00  0.99 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.93  0.91 0.88
CHN    0.99  0.94  0.84 0.79 0.74 0.55 0.41  0.30 0.22
IND    1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RAS    0.98  0.85  0.61 0.52 0.44 0.19 0.09  0.04 0.02
SAM    0.98  0.82  0.56 0.46 0.38 0.14 0.05  0.02 0.01
ROW    0.99  0.94  0.84 0.80 0.75 0.57 0.43  0.32 0.24
Figure 1 shows the resulting marginal abatement cost functions. It is immediately obvious 
that there exist huge differences between regions: in Japan, Australia and New Zealand, 
reducing emissions is most expensive whereas in China and in the former Soviet Union it is 
cheapest.  









































































































Abatement benefits are assumed linear in global emission reduction, hence marginal 
benefits are constant. Ayres and Walter (1991) proposed a central estimate of 35 US$ per 
ton of carbon abated. Finus et al. (2003) obtained a marginal damage value of 137.13 WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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US$ per ton carbon
9, based on estimates of Tol (1997). For our empirical exercise we 
follow a “revealed references approach” and pick a value for the marginal benefits so as to 
obtain an optimal emission reduction of 5% with respect to 1990 by the Annex B 
countries as agreed upon in the Kyoto protocol. This leads to a value of 43 US$ for the 
marginal benefits per ton carbon abated. This figure is in line with results by Plambeck and 
Hope (1996) who report that their best estimates of marginal benefits in a regional 
scenario fall within the range of 36.67 to 176.00 US$ per ton carbon
10. For the 
disaggregation of benefits over different regions, we adopted the simple assumption that 
benefits are disaggregated according to the region’s share in world GDP (see Table 2). 
5.2. Non-cooperative  Nash  outcome 
In Table 4 the non-cooperative outcome is reported. The first column shows the emission 
reduction in percentage of the projected 2010 baseline emissions, the second and the third 
column report respectively the marginal abatement cost and benefit and the last column 
contains the pay off in US$ per capita. These pay offs will be used as the deviation pay 
offs when we impose that the IEA should satisfy individual rationality.  
Table 4: Non-cooperative outcome 
  ABATEMENT C’ B’ PAY OFF/CAP 
 (%) (US$/TON C) (US$/TON C) (US$/CAP) 
CAN 0.20 0.69 0.69 4.11 
USA 2.56 8.76 8.76 5.19 
JPN 0.48 6.13 6.13 8.48 
EU15 2.67 10.27 10.27 4.48 
OEU 0.11 0.55 0.55 8.23 
CEA 0.41 0.67 0.67 1.30 
FSU 0.73 1.06 1.06 0.67 
AUZ 0.04 0.52 0.52 4.19 
MED 0.31 0.85 0.85 0.58 
MEA 0.69 1.16 1.16 0.99 
AFR 0.28 0.76 0.76 0.17 
CHN 4.27 2.25 2.25 0.23 
IND 0.27 0.95 0.95 0.16 
RAS 1.54 4.03 4.03 0.80 
SAM 1.10 4.13 4.13 1.08 
ROW 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.28 
WORLD 1.92 4.05 43.00 1.10 
Differences in abatement efforts follow from differences in the share of regions in global 
abatement benefits on the one hand and from the convexity of their cost function on the 
other hand. China for instance reduces most because abatement is cheap and abatement 
benefits are substantial. The second and the third column reveal that indeed each region 
abates emissions up to the point where its marginal cost is equal to its marginal benefit 
                                             
9 The exact number they report is 37.40 US$ per ton CO2. Multiplying with a factor  44
12  we obtained the figure 
of 137.13 US$. 
10 They report estimates within the range of 10 to 48 US$ per ton CO2. WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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and hence does not internalize environmental damages caused to other regions. The 
consequence is that the marginal costs are not equalized across regions what implies a 
significant lack of efficiency. The resulting emission reductions as reported in the first 
column and the pay off per capita in the last column are fairly low. This outcome clearly 
shows that an IEA to coordinate emission reduction efforts across regions is desirable 
since the same emission reduction could be achieved at a much lower cost.  
5.3.  First best outcome 
In Table 5 we present the first best command-and-control solution without transfers. From 
the first column we can see immediately that the amount of emission reduction 
undertaken is much higher than in the non-cooperative outcome. Furthermore, we can 
conclude from the second and the third column that the result is efficient: the marginal 
cost of each region is equal to the sum of marginal benefits over all regions. As a 
consequence, the world pay off per capita is now almost seven times higher than in the 
Nash outcome.  
The benefits from emission reduction however are not well distributed: we see that the 
countries in the shaded cells not only receive less than in the non-cooperative outcome, 
but they even get a negative pay off. The reason is that these countries have the cheapest 
carbon abatement possibilities and therefore they are required to abate a lot in the Pareto 
efficient solution. It is obvious that these countries would never agree on this particular 
IEA if they do not get compensated. This result clearly illustrates the need for international 
transfers in order to make all countries willing to cooperate in an IEA. The participation 
problem will be taken care of in the next section where we allow for permit trading among 
countries.  
Table 5: First best solution 
  ABATEMENT C’ B’ PAY OFF/CAP 
 (%) (US$/TON C) (US$/TON C) (US$/CAP) 
CAN 11.95 43.00 0.69 37.75 
USA 11.95 43.00 8.76 55.02 
JPN 3.30 43.00 6.13 99.28 
EU15 10.73 43.00 10.27 51.63 
OEU 8.16 43.00 0.55 94.58 
CEA 22.84 43.00 0.67 5.81 
FSU  25.61 43.00 1.06 -3.60 
AUZ 3.30 43.00 0.52 46.84 
MED 14.53 43.00 0.85 3.15 
MEA  22.57 43.00 1.16 -3.09 
AFR 14.53 43.00 0.76 0.59 
CHN  56.56 43.00 2.25 -10.87 
IND 11.65 43.00 0.95 0.73 
RAS 15.22 43.00 4.03 7.14 
SAM 10.88 43.00 4.13 10.14 
ROW  15.22 43.00 0.22 -1.32 
WORLD 22.72 43.00 43.00 7.49 WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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5.4. Emissions  trading 
In this section we report some results on the emissions trading model. We assume that 
emission permits are allocated for free and that the endowment of emission permits is 
used as a redistribution instrument across nations in order to stabilize the IEA. The two 
stability concepts elaborated in section 3.3 will be considered successively. If there is still 
some scope left after satisfying the participation constraints, the permit distribution will be 
manipulated further in order to deal with equity issues. The inequality aversion parameter 
will be the relevant criterion in this respect.  
5.4.1. Individual  rationality 
a) Full  cooperation 
(1) Unconstrained  endowments 
Table 6 contains the simulation results from permit trading among all regions when the 
agreement must satisfy individual rationality but no constraints are imposed on the 
allocation of permits. That is, we allow for negative permit endowments as well as for the 
allocation of ‘hot air’.  
The first two columns show the abatement and endowment of each region relative to the 
base year 2010. The next two columns include the endowment and emissions in million 
tons of carbon. The difference between these two columns results in the volume of trade, 
reported in the fifth column. A positive figure denotes the amount of permits a region sells 
whereas a negative figure denotes the number of permits to be bought. Accordingly an S 
in front of a row denotes that the country is a permit seller. When a region receives 
exactly the same pay off as in the non-cooperative equilibrium this is indicated with an 
asterisk (*) in the end of the row. This means that for this region the participation 
constraint is binding.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Table 6: Emissions trading – I.R. – unconstrained endowments () 0.5 ε =  
   ABAT.  ENDOW.  ENDOW. EMISSIONS VOL. TRADE C’  PAY OFF/CAP  
   (%)  (%)  (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C) (US$/TON C) (US$/CAP) 
   CAN  11.95  70.18  99.57 124.93 -25.36 43.00  4.11 *
   USA  11.95  67.09  1077.43 1414.04 -336.61 43.00  5.19 *
   JPN  3.30  14.46  51.46 344.24 -292.78 43.00  8.48 *
   EU15  10.73  42.56  411.86 863.93 -452.08 43.00  4.48 *
   OEU  8.16  -24.28  -5.41 20.47 -25.88 43.00  8.23 *
   CEA  22.84  72.03  147.45 157.96 -10.51 43.00  1.30 *
S FSU 25.61  78.85  527.30 497.50 29.80 43.00  0.67 *
   AUZ 3.30  71.84  68.78 92.59 -23.80 43.00  4.19 *
   MED 14.53  80.55  278.70 295.72 -17.02 43.00  0.58 *
S MEA 22.57  80.37  579.87 558.65 21.22 43.00  0.99 *
   AFR 14.53  83.35  335.43 343.99 -8.55 43.00  0.17 *
S CHN 56.56  62.32 1264.41 881.35 383.06 43.00  0.23 *
S IND  11.65  279.66  1523.72 481.39 1042.33 43.00  40.09  
   RAS 15.22  67.29  531.93 670.21 -138.28 43.00  0.80 *
   SAM 10.88  73.22  695.64 846.67 -151.03 43.00  1.08 *
S ROW 15.22  87.31  189.14 183.65 5.49 43.00  0.28 *
 WORLD 22.72  77.28  7777.28 7777.28 0.00 43.00  7.49  
From the marginal costs we see immediately that the solution is still first best: marginal costs across regions are 
equalised to the sum of marginal benefits. Indeed, a comparison with Table 5 shows that exactly the same amount of 
emissions is abated as in the Pareto efficient solution. The resulting average pay off per capita is also first best. Only 
the distribution of the pay offs has changed: all countries except India receive an amount of permits exactly large 
enough to ensure their non-cooperative pay off. This implies a negative permit endowment only for the ‘other 
European countries’ region (OEU). Apparently the individual rationality constraint ensures for all other regions that 
they receive a positive permit endowment. The remainder of the permits to be distributed are all allocated to the 
poorest country. This results in a large amount of hot air for India: it receives an allocation of not less than 279.66% 
of its business as usual emissions.  
(2) Constrained  endowments 
Next we consider what happens when we impose positivity and ‘no hot air’ constraints 
simultaneously on the permit allocation, still in the case of full cooperation. The 
requirement that the agreement must be individually rational still holds. The results are 
reported in Table 7.  
Due to the positivity constraint, the ‘OEU’ region now gets exactly zero endowments, 
what results in a pay off per capita larger than its Nash pay off. In addition, the ‘no hot 
air’ constraint imposes that India’s ‘hot air’ is taken away and is allocated conform our 
inequality aversion to the second, the third and the fourth poorest country. All these 
nations receive a permit endowment of exactly their business as usual emissions what 
yields them a pay off per capita well above their non-cooperative pay off. A new permit 
seller in this equilibrium is Africa.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Table 7: Emissions trading – I.R. – no neg. endowments and no hot air() 0.5 ε =  
   ABAT.  ENDOW.  ENDOW. EMISSIONS VOL. TRADE C’  PAY OFF/CAP  
   (%)  (%)  (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C) (US$/TON C) (US$/CAP) 
 CAN  12.77  70.02  99.35 123.78 -24.43 46.14  4.11 *
 USA  12.77  66.98  1075.70 1400.96 -325.27 46.14  5.19 *
 JPN  3.53  15.29  54.41 343.39 -288.98 46.14  8.48 *
 EU15  11.47  42.78  414.01 856.80 -442.80 46.14  4.48 *
 OEU  8.73  0.00  0.00 20.34 -20.34 46.14  26.75
 CEA  24.29  71.42  146.20 154.99 -8.80 46.14  1.30 *
S FSU  27.20  78.05  521.98 486.87 35.11 46.14  0.67 *
 AUZ  3.53  72.02  68.96 92.36 -23.40 46.14  4.19 *
 MED  15.50  80.18  277.39 292.35 -14.96 46.14  0.58 *
S MEA  24.01  79.67  574.86 548.31 26.54 46.14  0.99 *
S AFR  15.50  100.00  402.44 340.07 62.37 46.14  3.81
S CHN  59.12  100.00  2028.85 829.31 1199.54 46.14  25.06
S IND  12.44  100.00  544.86 477.06 67.80 46.14  3.41
 RAS  16.24  67.03  529.94 662.18 -132.25 46.14  0.80 *
 SAM  11.63  73.07  694.26 839.58 -145.32 46.14  1.08 *
S ROW  16.24  100.00  216.62 181.45 35.17 46.14  9.22
 WORLD 23.99  76.01  7649.81 7649.81 0.00 46.14  7.46  
A quick look at the marginal costs immediately reveals that the result is cost efficient but 
not first best. Each country still abates up to the point where its marginal cost equalizes 
the permit price. This permit price is however not equal to the aggregated marginal 
benefits but about 3 US$ higher. A higher equilibrium marginal abatement cost of each 
region implies that each region abates more. This can be verified by comparing the first 
column in Table 7 with the first column in Table 6. 
The intuition behind the increase in the permit price is the following. On the one hand we 
would like to give one nation, i.e. OEU a negative endowment but we are not allowed to 
because of the positivity constraint. A way to deal with this could be to increase the 
permit price; the country with an endowment of zero now has pay a higher permit price 
for each ton of carbon it emits. We found however that if only the positivity constraints 
are imposed, welfare is extracted from the constrained country by decreasing the permit 
price by 0.05 US$ compared to the first best outcome. The explanation is that although 
the region now faces a lower abatement cost and a lower cost of purchasing permits, it 
now bears more environmental damage. In our empirical exercise with an aggregate 
marginal benefit from emission reduction of 43 US$, this loss in environmental damage 
outweighs the reduced costs of OEU (see Table 1).  
On the other hand, optimality requires that India is allocated ‘hot air’ but also this is ruled 
out. A means of compensating this is a raise in the permit price: the nation with an 
allocation of 100% of its business as usual emissions can sell its permits now at a higher 
price. We found that imposing only ‘no hot air’ constraints, increased the permit price by 
3.28 US$.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Hence the no ‘hot air’ and positivity restrictions have an opposite effect on the permit 
price. Imposing them together on the maximization problem, results in a slightly more 
moderate increase in the permit price as reported in Table 7. A price increase can only be 
achieved by making the permits scarcer, i.e. by distributing less of them. This is confirmed 
if we compare the endowment in Table 7 with the one in Table 6. The loss in the pay off 
from abatement policy due to the imposition of no hot air and positivity constraints, 
amounts to approximately 0.37% with respect to the first best scenario.  
Finally we should note that the increase in the permit price strokes with our intuition 
behind condition (38). From Table 7 we see that the permit sellers belong to the poorest 
regions. Therefore the covariance between λ   and  NIM  will be negative what explains 
the increase in the permit price. 
b)  Partial cooperation – the Kyoto coalition 
(1) Unconstrained  endowments 
In Table 8 we report the results of an individually rational permit trading agreement among 
the Annex B countries of the Kyoto protocol, which in our set up roughly corresponds to 
coalition: 
{ } ,,, 1 5 , ,, , S CAN USA JPN EU OEU CEA FSU AUZ =  
No constraints are imposed yet on the permit allocations. The symbols used in the table 
have the same meaning as before. 
First, one should note that the result can be considered as a Nash equilibrium in which the 
coalition of cooperating countries behaves as one player. Indeed, within the coalition the 
benefits from emission abatement are completely internalised: each coalition member puts 
its marginal cost equal to the sum of marginal benefits over all coalition partners. All the 
outsiders from the coalition follow their Nash strategy and abate until their marginal cost is 
equal to their marginal benefit.  
In addition, an abatement percentage of 9.25% with respect to the 2010 business usual 
emissions is undertaken within the coalition. This is equivalent to an emission reduction of 
5% with respect to 1990 emissions
11 as imposed by the Kyoto protocol. Furthermore, 
each member of the coalition exactly receives its non-cooperative pay off, except for the 
former Soviet Union. Since this is the poorest country in the coalition, it is allocated an 
amount of hot air. This means that our welfare economics model provides a justification 
                                             
11 1990 emissions amount to approximately 3880.41 million ton carbon (IEA, 2001). WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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for the controversial allocation of hot air to Russia
12. For negative endowments there is no 
scope since this cannot be done without making a region worse off compared to its Nash 
outcome.  
Table 8: Emissions trading in Kyoto coalition 
I.R. – unconstrained endowments - () 0.5 ε =  
   ABAT. ENDOW.  ENDOW.  EMISSIONS VOL. 
TRADE 
C’ B’  PAY OFF/CAP  
   (%) (%) (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C) (MIO TON C)(US$/TON C) (US$/TON
C)
(US$/CAP) 
   CAN   8.13  90.75   128.77   130.35 -1.58 28.65  0.69  4.11 *
   USA   8.13  89.76  1441.46  1475.41 -33.95 28.65  8.76  5.19 *
   JPN   2.21  80.73   287.40   348.11 -60.71 28.65  6.13  8.48 *
   EU15   7.28  84.68   819.54   897.30 -77.76 28.65  10.27  4.48 *
   OEU   5.51  71.28    15.89    21.06 -5.17 28.65  0.55  8.23 *
S CEA  15.86  88.37   180.90   172.23 8.66 28.65  0.67  1.30 *
S FSU  17.89 108.27   724.07   549.13 174.94 28.65  1.06  12.93  
  AUZ   2.21  93.17    89.20 93.63 -4.42 28.65  0.52  4.19 *
 MED    0.31 0.00  0.00 344.90 0.00 0.85  0.85  1.48  
 MEA    0.69 0.00  0.00 716.55 0.00 1.16  1.16  2.56  
  AFR   0.28 0.00  0.00   401.33 0.00 0.76  0.76  0.43  
  CHN   4.27 0.00  0.00  1942.20 0.00 2.25  2.25  0.68  
  IND   0.27 0.00  0.00   543.37 0.00 0.95  0.95  0.41  
  RAS   1.54 0.00  0.00   778.40 0.00 4.03  4.03  2.10  
  SAM   1.10 0.00  0.00   939.62 0.00 4.13  4.13  2.82  
  ROW   0.08 0.00  0.00   216.44 0.00 0.22  0.22  0.73  
 S  9.25 90.75  3687.22 3687.22 0.00 28.65  28.65  6.77  
 WORLD 4.91 36.64  3687.22 9570.04 0.00 12.44  43.00  2.22  
Finally, we should point to the fact that all the outsiders from the coalition are better off 
than in the non-cooperative outcome (see Table 4) although they follow exactly the same 
strategy. This illustrates that they free ride on the abatement efforts undertaken by the 
coalition members.  
(2) Constrained  endowments 
We now impose that allocating hot air or negative endowments is not allowed. The results 
are reported in Table 9. From the third column we see that the hot air is taken away from 
the former Soviet Union and given to the second poorest coalition member i.e. the central 
European countries. FSU and CEA are now the only coalition members that receive more 
than in the non-cooperative equilibrium.  
As in the full cooperation case, the permit price now also has increased. This illustrates 
that the Samuelson rule for optimal emission reductions by the coalition (see equation (32)
) breaks down as predicted in section 4.2.2. The resulting emission reduction within the 
coalition is more than 1% higher than in the case where hot air is allowed. This leads to a 
                                             
12 The Kyoto Protocol calls for an emission reduction by Russia to 100% of 1990 emissions in the period 2008-
2012. However, as a result of the decline in economic activity, the Russian federation has projected 2010 
carbon emissions lower than in 1990.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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reduction in the pay off by 1.5% for the Kyoto group compared to the case with 
unconstrained allocations and an increase in the pay off by 4.4% for the world as a whole.  
Table 9: Emissions trading in Kyoto coalition 
I.R. – no neg. endowments and no hot air - () 0.5 ε =  
   ABAT. ENDOW.  ENDOW.  EMISSIONS VOL. TRADE C’ B’  PAY OFF/CAP  





 CAN   9.41  89.98   127.67  128.54  -0.87 33.38  0.69  4.11 *
 USA   9.41  89.02  1429.67 1454.89 -25.22 33.38  8.76  5.19 *
 JPN   2.57  80.15   285.31  346.83 -61.52 33.38  6.13  8.48 *
 EU15   8.43  83.90   812.01  886.16 -74.15 33.38  10.27  4.48 *
 OEU   6.40  70.24    15.65   20.86  -5.21 33.38  0.55  8.23 *
S CEA  18.23  98.44   201.52  167.39  34.12 33.38  0.67  9.08
S FSU  20.52 100.00   668.76  531.54 137.22 33.38  1.06  9.87
 AUZ   2.57  92.86    88.90   93.28  -4.38 33.38  0.52  4.19 *
 MED   0.31   0.00     0.00  344.90   0.00  0.85  0.85  1.65
 MEA   0.69   0.00     0.00  716.55   0.00  1.16  1.16  2.86
 AFR   0.28   0.00     0.00  401.33   0.00  0.76  0.76  0.48
 CHN   4.27   0.00     0.00 1942.20   0.00  2.25  2.25  0.77
 IND   0.27   0.00     0.00  543.37   0.00  0.95  0.95  0.46
 RAS   1.54   0.00     0.00  778.40   0.00  4.03  4.03  2.34
 SAM   1.10   0.00     0.00  939.62   0.00  4.13  4.13  3.15
 ROW   0.08   0.00     0.00  216.44   0.00  0.22  0.22  0.81
 S  10.67 89.33  3629.50 3629.50 0.00 33.38  28.65  6.67
 WORLD  5.48 36.06  3629.50 9512.32 0.00 14.14  43.00  2.32
5.4.2. Internal  stability 
In Appendix F : and Appendix G : we illustrate that neither the grand coalition nor the 
Kyoto coalition are internally stable. In both cases cooperation between the coalition 
members does not generate enough surpluses to compensate all regions that have an 
incentive to deviate in order to free ride on the remaining coalition’s effort. This illustrates 
that internal stability is a more stringent requirement than individual rationality.  
In order to focus on the most interesting potentially internally stable coalitions, we used an 
algorithm (Eyckmans, 2001) to check which potentially stable coalitions generate the 
largest surplus in terms of world abatement. The result is reported in Table 10. Under each 
region, the number indicates whether the region belongs to a coalition: a “1” means that 
the corresponding region is a member of the coalition; a “0” denotes that it does not 
belong to that coalition. Together these digits form the key that describes the composition 
of the coalition. The last two columns give the abatement in percentage of 2010 
emissions for the coalition and for the world as a whole.  
We see that the largest coalition in terms of abatement consists of only three members: 
USA, EU15 and CHN. The abatement percentage resulting from this coalition structure is 
far below the one undertaken in the first best full cooperation scenario (see Table 6) but 
significantly larger than the percentage resulting from the efficient (i.e. with unconstrained 
endowments) permit trading agreement within the Kyoto coalition (see Table 8). The other WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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nine largest potentially stable coalitions contain at least 6 and at most 8 members. It is 
worth noting that the CAN, JPN, RAS and SAM belong to none of the coalitions in Table 
10 whereas EU15 and CHN belong to all of the ten coalitions. This can probably be 
explained by the fact that CHN has the lowest marginal abatement costs. Hence including 
CHN in the permit agreement makes emission reduction cheaper. EU15 on the other hand, 
has the highest marginal abatement benefit. If they would leave, the permit price would 
fall resulting in less emission reduction while they have a high interest in emission 
reduction taking place. 
Table 10: Ten biggest potentially internally stable coalitions  
in terms of world abatement 




0  1  0  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0  18.78  8.70 
0 0 0 1  0 0 1  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1  14.50 8.67 
0 0 0 1  0  1 1 0 0 1  0  1 1 0 0 1  14.89 8.60 
0 0 0 1  0  1 1 0  1 1 1 1  00  0  1  14.87 8.59 
0 0 0 1 1  1  1  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0  15.73  8.52 
0 0 0 1  0  1 1 1 0  1 1 1 0 0 0 0  15.49  8.51 
0 0 0 1  0  1 1 0  1 1 0  1  00  0  1  15.29 8.51 
0 0 0 1  0  1 1 0 0 1 1 1 00  0  1  15.12 8.51 
0 0 0 1  0 0 1  0 0 1  0  1 1 0 0 1  14.84 8.48 
0 0 0 1  0 0 1  0  1 1 0  1 1 0 0 0  14.84  8.46 
As an illustration, the stability analysis for the largest potentially stable coalition is 
reported in Table 11. The first column contains the coalition key
13. The first line shows the 
pay off for the different members of the coalition in the PANE w.r.t. coalition 
“0101000000010000” without any transfers or emissions trading. The second line 
contains the pay off for the PANE w.r.t. the two player coalition “0001000000010000”, 
i.e. the remaining coalition after USA has left the original coalition “0101000000010000”. 
Hence it is assumed in line 2 that the two remaining regions continue to cooperate but 
they reoptimize their emission strategies among themselves. According to Table 11 USA 
cannot improve its pay off by defecting from the coalition. Line 3 shows a similar result 
for EU15. The fourth line illustrates what happens with the pay off for the coalition 
members of “0101000000010000” when CHN deviates. I.e. it contains the pay off for 
the PANE w.r.t. coalition “0101000000000000”. We see that CHN could improve its pay 
off by defecting from the original coalition provided the remaining coalition stays together. 
Hence CHN needs to be compensated in order to be willing to stay in the coalition. The 
question is whether the coalition generates enough surpluses in order to do that. This is 
                                             
13 Remember that we have 12 regions ordered in the following way: 
{} ,,, 1 5 , ,,, , , ,, ,,, , N CAN USA JPN EU OEU CEA FSU AUZ MED MEA AFR CHN IND RAS SAM ROW =  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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verified in the last line of Table 11. It contains for each region the minimal transfer needed 
to stabilize the coalition. We read from the table that keeping CHN in the coalition requires 
a transfer of 5313.65 million US$. From USA and EU15 we can subtract respectively 
2009.27 million US$ and 3367.17 US$ without giving them an incentive to defect from 
the coalition. The lower right cell shows the sum of all transfers needed to stabilize the 
coalition. The negative figure indicates that there is still some surplus left to be distributed. 
From this we can conclude that the coalition is potentially internally stable. 
Table 11: Stability analysis for  { } ,1 5 , SU S A E UC H N =  
COALITION USA  EU15  CHN   
010 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 010000 6636.59 8434.33  -4822.61   
000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 010000 4627.32  5439.96 -1390.22   
010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 010000 4152.50  5067.16  -929.54  
010 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000 1458.12 2234.04  491.04   
min. stabilizing transfer  -2009.27 -3367.17  5313.65  -62.79 
We now allow for emissions trading among regions within the coalition. The permits are 
distributed for free over the coalition members in such a way that no region has an 
incentive to defect from the coalition assuming that the remaining coalition stays together. 
The results are reported in Table 12.  
Table 12: Emissions trading in coalition  { } ,1 5 , SU S A E UC H N =  
I.S. – unconstrained endowments - () 0.5 ε =  
   ABAT. ENDOW.  ENDOW.  EMISSIONS VOL. TRADE C’ B’ PAY OFF/CAP  








(US$/TON C) (US$/CAP) 
 CAN  0.20 0.00  0.00 141.60 0.00 0.69 0.69  18.67
 USA  6.10 88.02 1413.52 1507.97 -94.45 21.27 8.76  15.93 **
 JPN  0.48 0.00  0.00 354.28 0.00 6.13 6.13  38.68
 EU15  5.46 78.18 756.66 914.94 -158.28 21.27 10.27  12.29 **
 OEU  0.11 0.00  0.00 22.26 0.00 0.55 0.55  37.37
 CEA  0.41 0.00  0.00 203.88 0.00 0.67 0.67  5.90
 FSU  0.73 0.00  0.00 663.91 0.00 1.06 1.06  3.08
 AUZ  0.04 0.00  0.00 95.70 0.00 0.52 0.52  19.02
 MED  0.31 0.00  0.00 344.90 0.00 0.85 0.85  2.63
 MEA  0.69 0.00  0.00 716.55 0.00 1.16 1.16  4.54
 AFR  0.28 0.00  0.00 401.33 0.00 0.76 0.76  0.77
S CHN  33.80 78.66 1595.83 1343.10 252.73 21.27 2.25  0.37
 IND  0.27 0.00  0.00 543.37 0.00 0.95 0.95  0.73
 RAS  1.54 0.00  0.00 778.40 0.00 4.03 4.03  3.73
 SAM  1.10 0.00  0.00 939.62 0.00 4.13 4.13  5.02
 ROW  0.08 0.00  0.00 216.44 0.00 0.22 0.22  1.29
 S  18.18 81.82  3766.01 3766.01 0.00 21.27 21.27  4.69
 WORLD  8.70 37.42  3766.01 9188.26 0.00 10.05 43.00  4.11
We observe that the coalition members internalise the benefits from emission reduction. 
Each region abates until its marginal cost equals the aggregated marginal benefits within WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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the coalition. Furthermore, USA and EU15 receive exactly enough permits so that their pay 
offs are equal to the one they would have if they left the coalition unilaterally, provided 
the remaining coalition stays together. This is indicated with a double asterisk in the end 
of the row. The rest of the permits is allocated to the poorest coalition region, i.e. CHN. 
The question of whether or not to allocate hot air or negative endowments does not apply 
here: the Samuelson condition for the optimal emission reduction by the coalition 
{ } ,1 5 , USA EU CHN  is fulfilled and does not require the allocation of hot air nor a negative 
amount of emission permits. With a percentage of 88% w.r.t. business as usual emissions 
the USA gets the largest relative endowment. Finally we should point to the fact that CHN 
is the only permit selling region in this PANE. This raises the issue of market power and 
non-competitive behaviour in a permit trading agreement which we do not deal with in this 
paper. It might however call for a consideration of the second largest potentially internally 
stable coalition since it contains 6 members and thus possibly more permit sellers as we 
see from Table 10.  
The internal stability analysis which is included in Appendix H : confirms that this coalition 
“0001001001111001” can be internally stabilized through the right transfers. In Table 13 
we report the optimal permit allocations and the results of emissions trading within this 
coalition. First we note that in the equilibrium only EU15 is a permit buyer. In addition we 
see once more from the marginal costs and benefits columns that the Samuelson rule is 
satisfied within the coalition. Furthermore the asterisks indicate that again all countries 
except the poorest receive exactly their deviation pay off. As in the previously discussed 
three-member coalition also here neither hot air nor negative permit amounts are allocated.  WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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Table 13: Emissions trading in coalition  { } 15, , , , , , S EU FSU MEA AFR CHN IND ROW =  
I.S. – unconstrained endowments - () 0.5 ε =  
   A BAT.E NDOW. ENDOW.E MISSIONS VOL. 
TRADE
C’ B’ PAY OFF/CAP









 CAN  0.20 0.00  0.00 141.60 0.00 0.69 0.69  18.61
 USA  2.56 0.00  0.00 1564.89 0.00 8.76 8.76  25.69
 JPN  0.48 0.00  0.00 354.28 0.00 6.13 6.13  38.54
 EU15  4.30 67.58 654.07 926.14 -272.07 16.66 10.27  9.90 **
 OEU  0.11 0.00  0.00 22.26 0.00 0.55 0.55  37.24
 CEA  0.41 0.00  0.00 203.88 0.00 0.67 0.67  5.88
S FSU  10.83 93.43 624.79 596.32 28.47 16.66 1.06  2.69 **
 AUZ  0.04 0.00  0.00 95.70 0.00 0.52 0.52  18.95
 MED  0.31 0.00  0.00 344.90 0.00 0.85 0.85  2.62
S MEA  9.44 94.13 679.16 653.42 25.73 16.66 1.16  3.96 **
S AFR  5.90 96.40 387.96 378.69 9.26 16.66 0.76  0.72 **
S CHN  27.61 81.80 1659.61 1468.67 190.95 16.66 2.25  0.49 **
S IND  4.69 97.39 530.63 519.33 11.31 16.66 0.95  0.71
 RAS  1.54 0.00  0.00 778.40 0.00 4.03 4.03  3.72
 SAM  1.10 0.00  0.00 939.62 0.00 4.13 4.13  5.00
S ROW  6.20 96.73 209.55 203.19 6.35 16.66 0.22  1.25 **
 S  14.05 85.50  4745.76 4745.76 0.00 16.66 16.66  1.77  
 WORLD 8.67 47.16  4745.76 9191.30 0.00 11.16 43.00  4.34  
The reason why we find optimality to require an allocation of hot air if the agreement has 
to be individually rational whereas this is not the case when we impose the internal 
stability restriction is the following. Being inequality averse, we want to give the surplus of 
cooperation after the internal stability restrictions are satisfied to the poorest region in the 
form of emission permits. The internal stability restriction however is more demanding 
than the individual rationality constraint. Therefore the surplus left to be distributed is not 
likely to be large enough to provide the poorest region with ‘hot air’ or there is less scope 
for equity considerations in the allocation of permits. 
5.5. Sensitivity  analysis 
Because of the large uncertainty w.r.t. the aggregated marginal benefit from emission 
reduction, a sensitivity analysis with respect this figure is appropriate. We found that for 
low values of the aggregate marginal benefit (i.e. roughly below 37 US$), binding 
positivity constraints had a positive effect on the permit price. For a figure above 37 US$, 
binding positivity constraints exerted a downward pressure on the permit price. The reason 
is that if marginal benefits are relatively high, the way to extract income from the 
positivity constrained regions is by distributing more permits (i.e. by allowing for more 
environmental damage) with a lower permit price as a result. When we imposed the 
positivity and no hot air constraints simultaneously, the value of the aggregate marginal 
benefit had only quantitative, no qualitative effect on our results. Lower marginal benefits 
just result in less emission reduction to be undertaken, hence more permits to be WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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distributed. Furthermore we found that for lower values of the aggregated marginal 
benefit, the positivity restriction on permit allocations was not binding anymore for the 
grand coalition.  
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a varying degree of inequality aversion on the total 
amount of permits distributed (light shaded bars) and on the permit price (dark shaded 
bars) in the case of full cooperation, individual rationality and both the positivity and the 
no hot air constraints imposed on the permit endowments. We see that the amount of 
permits distributed decreases as the global planner becomes more inequality averse. The 
reason is that at a higher degree of inequality aversion we want to give a larger 
compensation to poorer regions and subtract more income from richer regions. Since this 
can only be done to a limited extent through the distribution of permits, it is achieved by 
adapting the permit price. A higher permit price means that the rich permit buying 
countries face more expensive permit prices whereas the poor permit selling regions 
receive more revenues for the permits they sell. A higher permit price implies higher 
marginal abatement costs since each abating region still follows the decentralised permit 
market equilibrium condition (see condition (17)). Thus they don’t equalise marginal 
abatement costs with the sum of marginal abatement benefits or the Samuelson condition 
for the optimal provision of emission abatement breaks down.  
Figure 2: Effect of a varying degree of inequality aversion  



















































































A similar graph could be drawn for the case of a PANE where permit trading takes place 
within a coalition under individual rationality and constrained emission endowments. 
However, if we vary the degree of inequality aversion in the case of a PANE w.r.t. a 
coalition on which we impose internal stability, this will in most cases have no effect on 
the permit price or total endowment since the no hot air constraint is not likely to be 
binding in this case.  
 WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
 
39
6. CONCLUSION   
In this paper we explored the equity and efficiency properties of self-enforcingly designed 
international carbon agreements. We used a welfare economics framework while focusing 
on one particular type of agreement i.e. an international tradable permit agreement. While 
the decentralised permit market equilibrium ensures that cost efficiency prevails, the 
allocation of tradable quotas over the different regions is used to compensate regions that 
otherwise would not be willing to participate in or comply with the agreement. Then, if 
there is some scope left, the permit distribution is manipulated further in order to deal with 
equity issues. In order to study partial cooperation between regions as is observed in 
reality (the Kyoto Protocol is an example), we adopted the Partial Agreement Nash 
Equilibrium concept which roughly comes down to a Nash equilibrium where the players 
are coalitions instead of individual countries. Two stability concepts i.e. individual 
rationality and internal and external stability were considered. 
We found that if we allowed for negative permit endowments and for the allocation of hot 
air, the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of carbon emission reduction was 
preserved. If however the allocation of hot air or negative endowments was ruled out, the 
allocation of permits could be considered as a limited international redistribution instrument 
and the Samuelson condition broke down. This could be seen from the marginal social 
values of income that were not equalized in the equilibrium for regions that faced a binding 
constraint on their endowment.  
A simulation model with 16 aggregate regions was used to illustrate the different solution 
concepts and to gain more insight in the effect on welfare of binding permit allocation 
constraints. The non-cooperative Nash solution yielded a very modest overall carbon 
emission abatement of 1.92% with respect to the reference business as usual emissions in 
2010. Mainly regions with high marginal abatement benefits and cheap carbon abatement 
possibilities contributed to this result.  
A tradable permit agreement among all regions with unconstrained endowments in which 
the assignment of permits was used to make the agreement individually rational, resulted 
in a first best abatement percentage of 22.72% w.r.t. 2010 emissions. When we imposed 
no hot air and positivity constraints on the endowments, the total amount of permits 
distributed decreased and the permit price increased. The resulting abatement undertaken 
amounted to 23.99%. Although this is positive from an environmental perspective, it 
implied a lower social welfare due to the inefficiency of the result.  
A simulation of emissions trading under individual rationality within the Kyoto coalition 
yielded some interesting results. First, we found that the former Soviet Union, the poorest 
region in the Kyoto coalition in terms of GDP per capita, was allocated hot air. Hence our WELFARE MAXIMIZING EMISSION PERMIT ALLOCATIONS UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
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model provides a justification for the allocation of hot air to Russia in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Secondly, the imposition of constraints on the endowments yielded qualitatively the same 
result as in the full cooperation case. Remarkably was however that although the Kyoto 
coalition faced a reduction in its average pay off due to these constraints, the welfare of 
the world as a whole increased. Furthermore the positivity constraints were not binding in 
this case.  
Next we checked some tradable permit agreements on their internal stability. Neither the 
grand coalition nor the Kyoto coalition appeared to be potentially internally stable. Both 
coalitions did not generate enough surpluses in order to compensate the regions that have 
an incentive to free ride on the coalition’s efforts. The largest potentially internally stable 
coalition in terms of world abatement yielded an abatement effort of 8.70% w.r.t. 2010 
and consisted only of three regions: the USA, the European Union and China. Permit 
trading within the coalition showed that neither the positivity constraints nor the no hot air 
constraints were binding.  
In summary we can conclude that ruling out negative or hot air allocations reduces welfare 
if at least one of these constraints is binding. However when more stringent stability 
concepts are adopted, the constraints on endowments become less binding. A sensitivity 
analysis revealed that the welfare loss due to these constraints gets larger as we become 
more inequality averse.  
We are well aware of the aspects that require further investigation. First, concerning 
participation in international environmental agreements, we did not consider the concept of 
coalitional stability. This allows for coalitions of two or more regions not to agree upon the 
agreement if they find that their joint pay off in a partial agreement Nash would be higher 
than the pay off they obtain under the current agreement. We did not consider this 
concept since it would imply that in our empirical exercise with 16 regions, 2
16 different 
coalitions have to be checked what was beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, the 
model should be extended to a dynamic setting in order to include intertemporal flexibility 
mechanisms such as the banking of permits. A dynamic emission model would also allow 
for a better incorporation of the main physical features of the global warming problem. 
Thirdly, we did not take into account non-competitive behaviour of permit trading firms 
that might result from market power when there are only a limited number of permit 





Appendix A : First order conditions of the unconstrained 
allocation problem 
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Deriving this Lagrangian with respect to  i ω  gives: 
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where  () () jj j S j NIM E α ρ ωω =− − denotes net permit imports of region j. Equation 
(41) can be simplified as follows: 
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 again should be interpreted as the marginal social value to 
region i of an additional unit of income. The first term on the right hand side cancels out 
because of the firms’ profit maximizing behaviour, given by condition (17). Furthermore, 
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 again as the marginal benefit of abatement to region j expressed in 
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Appendix B :  Samuelson rule under positivity constraints 
Call the set of unconstrained regions U and the set of constrained regions C, both being a 
subset of S . Then, using (17), the first order conditions in (43) become 
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In order to get a better insight in to how these two expressions are related to each other, 
it is useful to focus on the case where there is only one nation k for which the positivity 
constraint is binding. Expression (44) and (45) then reduce to: 
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, the two last terms in equation (47) 
exceed the two last terms in (46). Furthermore, the sum of net imports among 
unconstrained regions is negative because the constrained region with zero endowment is 
a permit importer and is excluded from the sum. Therefore, one can verify that the first 
term between brackets in condition (47) is negative and smaller than the one in condition 
(46). Since  () 0 S ρω ′ < , equation (47) must exceed equation (46). This means that 
ideally, the constrained region should have to face a higher marginal abatement cost in 
order to compensate for the fact that it receives too much permits. However, since the 
abatement efforts are determined in a decentralised way via the permit market, i.e. each 
firm freely chooses its own abatement effort such that its marginal abatement costs are 
equal to the permit price, this correction via abatement efforts will not take place. 
Appendix C : Samuelson rule under ‘no hot air’ constraints 
Using (17), condition (36) can also be interpreted as follows: 
()
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BAU i S j j j j i
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If we again consider the special case where for only one region k the allocation faces a 
binding constraint by its business as usual emissions and we denote the set of  
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unconstrained regions with U and the set of constrained regions with C, both being a 
subset of S , condition (48) becomes 
()
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, the two last terms in equation (49) exceed the second and the 
third one in equation (50). In order to compare the first term between brackets in both 
equations, we should note that the unweighted sum of net imports among unconstrained 
regions will be positive since the constrained region is an exporter. This implies that in 
both (49) and (50), the first term between brackets is again negative but now the first 
term in (49) is larger than the one in (50) after multiplication with  () S ρ ω ′ . Because of the 
presence of the positive term 
UC








 in condition (50), we cannot conclude in 
general that optimally the marginal abatement cost of unconstrained regions should exceed 





 takes a value smaller than 
1, this will hold in most cases. 
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Appendix E :  Geographical coverage 
LABEL  NAME  COMPOSITION 
CAN Canada   
USA USA   
JPN Japan   
EU15 European  Union   
OEU Other  Europe  Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
CEA  Eastern Europe  Bulgaria, Czech-Rep, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak-Rep, 
Slovenia 
FSU  Former Soviet Union   
AUZ Australazia    Australia and New Zealand 
MED Mediterranean  Turkey,  Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia 
MEA  Middle  East  Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
AFR  Africa  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra-Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
CHN  China  China, Hong Kong 
IND India   
RAS  Rest of Asia  South  Korea,  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan 
SAM  South America  Costa-Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haití, Honduras, Jamaica, Antilles, Nicaragua, Panamá, Trinidad-
Tobago, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú, Argentina, 
Brasil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay 




A p p e n d i x   F   :  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix G : Stability analysis for the Kyoto coalition 
KYOTO COALITION  CAN USA  JPN EU15  OEU CEA  FSU AUZ   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  178.51 2481.57 2915.79 4074.68 254.19  -118.37 -1134.31 227.19 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  327.82 2396.26 2801.52 3920.77 244.28 -111.18  -1080.90 218.45 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  150.44 2739.09 1988.56 2933.59 174.75 -0.58  -478.47 159.02 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  183.53 2462.74 2526.04 3616.94 216.20 -7.29  -615.53 196.44 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  169.77 2243.32 2066.22 3406.30 182.24 38.90  -349.82 167.08 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  179.03 2480.00 2871.20 4029.87 267.24  -107.52 -1083.70 224.18 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  158.75 2221.23 2680.25 3716.78 233.39  306.65 -1103.54 208.12 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 000 0 0 0 0 0  104.42 1527.45 2164.77 2873.86 187.34  -170.94  389.34 164.84 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 000 0 0 0 0 0  178.37 2472.07 2867.91 4022.81 250.15  -108.70 -1087.30 252.96 
Min. stabilizing transfer  149.315 257.519 -389.755 -668.379 13.051 425.018 1523.66 25.77 1336.19
Appendix H : Stability analysis for coalition 
{ } 15, , , , , , S EU FSU MEA AFR CHN IND ROW =  
COALITION  EU15 FSU  MEA  AFR CHN  IND ROW   
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8615.48 331.97 457.80 467.37-2451.96 615.611  78.27
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 00   1 1 1 1 0 0 1 4081.66 343.13 392.12 282.33 182.49 357.05  72.12
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 00   1 1 1 1 0 0 1 7541.84 806.42 397.95 408.46-2205.09 538.29  68.10
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   0 1 1 1 0 0 1 7546.73 294.14 886.63 410.80-2157.26 540.83  69.41
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   1 0 1 1 0 0 1 8090.20 325.58 443.03 621.69-2218.77 582.88  76.23
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   1 1 0 1 0 0 1 3512.16 -58.57 6.33 131.81 729.99  189.35 -3.75
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   1 1 1 0 0 0 1 8003.85 328.15 443.98 440.55-2153.59  766.04  76.57
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 00   1 1 1 1 0 0 0 8395.20 323.07 445.77 455.37-2399.89 599.84  184.11
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